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SUMMARY
w With an estimated 3.8 billion 
Internet users worldwide, new 
media in the form of Web 2.0 
applications and its user-
generated content increasingly 
rival traditional media as the 
means of circulating and 
gathering information. Central 
to the power and importance of 
social media is its visuality and 
the speed with which content 
can circulate. However, 
research and policy often focus 
on the politics of social media in 
terms of revolutionary change, 
as a tool of radicalization, or as a 
resource for disseminating 
information and the challenges 
this poses to states. 
As a part of the Militarization 
2.0 project, this Policy Brief 
examines the social media 
content that celebrates 
militarism as an important 
aspect of everyday social media 
usage and the related meaning 
construction overlooked by 
policymakers. The research 
results indicate that while there 
is an abundance of militaristic 
content, much of this content 
reaches targeted audiences.
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INTRODUCTION 
Social media is a nearly ubiquitous 
aspect of everyday life, with 
political and social implications that 
societies are only now starting to 
approach. With an estimated  
3.8 billion Internet users worldwide, 
new media in the form of Web 
2.0 applications and their user-
generated content increasingly 
rival traditional media as the 
means of circulating and gathering 
information. Central to the power 
and importance of social media is its 
visuality and the speed with which 
content can circulate. Researchers 
and policymakers, however, have 
primarily focused on the political 
implications of social media in terms 
of promoting revolutionary change 
(e.g. the optimism around the ‘Arab 
Spring’), as a tool of radicalization 
(e.g. concerns about recruitment to 
terrorist organizations such as the 
Islamic State group) or as a resource 
for disseminating information and 
the challenges this poses to states 
(e.g. Wikileaks). 
This Policy Brief builds on the 
work of the Militarization 2.0 
project, a three-country team of 
researchers working on a four-year 
study of the militarization of social 
media. For this brief, the project 
examined a crucial aspect of 
everyday social media usage and 
meaning construction that is almost 
totally ignored by policymakers: 
the presence of the military and 
content that celebrates militarism. 
It demonstrates the sheer scale of 
such content, discusses its meaning, 
shows how it is engaged with and 
circulated by social media users 
and discusses the implications for 
citizens and government. 
The conclusions are perhaps 
counter-intuitive. While the 
research identifies an extraordinary 
volume of social media content that 
celebrates war and militarism, much 
of which is engaged with by tens of 
millions of social media users, it is 
also fair to say that the vast majority 
of social media users do not see 
nor engage with online militarism. 
There is, therefore, a highly effective 
form of ‘targeted militarism’ 
through which those who heavily 
engage with militarized social 
media become ever more effectively 
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targeted by the algorithms within 
social media itself. This Policy 
Brief explores the implications this 
targeting has for policymakers. 
The discussion seeks to 
inform policymakers and their 
staff, members of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) and others 
interested in assessing the 
political implications of meaning 
construction related to social media 
content more generally, and the 
content of the large-scale producers 
of conventional weapons (major 
arms producers), the military video 
games industry, and private military 
and security companies (PMSCs) in 
particular.
The findings are particularly 
important to ministries of 
foreign affairs and other parts 
of government that engage 
internationally or work with 
international politics or are 
concerned with digital diplomacy 
and other more traditional forms 
of security and communication. 
Similarly, it is vital for CSOs 
working on security issues or 
for disarmament, which face 
challenges from the online 
activities of those who oppose 
disarmament. Given how 
fundamental digital information 
and online communication are 
for communicating with and 
connecting people, this Policy Brief 
outlines how social media can be a 
political tool in both expected and 
unexpected ways. It highlights the 
underlying mechanisms that shape 
the messaging on social media—
specifically in corporate YouTube 
videos, Twitter feeds, Facebook 
pages, and homepages—and how it 
is crucial at this juncture to develop 
the skills needed to see how these 
mechanisms can be manipulated 
to emphasize particular 
understandings of national security 
associated with militarism.
THE COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION1
The current global information 
age is soundly centred on a 
communications technology 
revolution that is redefining ‘the 
relationship between producers and 
receivers of online information’.2 
This relationship is a crucial aspect 
of how policymakers and their 
constituents interact. In addition, 
the recognition that information 
and communication technologies 
(ICTs) are a central part of modern 
society has prompted policymakers 
and others to include ICTs in 
their long-term goals, for example 
through the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals, 
corporate social responsibility 
strategies and state-level education 
plans. In this context, however, 
there are a number of contributors 
that are often overlooked because 
they are considered to be non-
political in their messaging, such 
as corporate actors that use social 
media to sell products and services 
to general audiences. What does 
it mean when corporate branding 
lends itself to national identity 
construction at the same time as it is 
geared to wide swathes of the public 
for general consumption? Crucial 
in the context of militarized social 
media is the fact that while some of 
the social media content is designed 
to sell products in the conventional 
sense, such as military video game 
1  The research presented here is based 
primarily on platforms popular in North 
America and Europe (YouTube, Facebook and 
Twitter) and posts primarily in English.
2  Carpenter, C. and Drezner, D. W., ‘Inter-
national relations 2.0: The implications of 
new media for an old profession’, International 
Relations Perspective, vol. 11 (2010), pp. 255–72.
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advertisements that are designed 
to sell a video game or recruitment 
advertising for the military or a 
PMSC, much of it also is designed 
to sell national security as military 
security, and to promote the view 
that the presence of the military in 
everyday life is natural. 
Digital information is becoming 
a fundamental part of the 
everyday lives of many people. 
More than 98 per cent of stored 
information is now in digital 
form. User-generated content and 
other Web 2.0 applications are 
now challenging mass media as 
a central way of gathering news 
and other information.3 The 
International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU)—the UN’s specialized 
agency for ICTs—issues an annual 
report on the state of ICTs and 
ICT use.4 According to the most 
recent of these reports, urban 
populations have more access to the 
Internet and younger generations 
are growing up with social media 
as an unquestioned part of their 
everyday lives. While many parts 
of Africa and South East Asia lag in 
comparison, 830 million, or  
80 per cent of the young people in 
the 104 countries covered in the 
UN report, are online. Regardless 
of region, men are online more than 
women, and the largest gender gap 
is observed in the Least Developed 
Countries. Of the 3.8 billion Internet 
3  Cukier, K. N. and Mayer-Schoenberger, V., 
‘The rise of big data: how it’s changing the way 
we think about the world’, Foreign Affairs, May/
June 2013; and Ghannam, J., Social Media in the 
Arab World Electronic Resource: Leading up to 
the Uprising of 2011 (Center for International 
Media Assistance and National Endowment for 
Democracy: Washington, DC, 2011).
4  International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), ‘ICT facts and figures, 2017’, ICT Data 
and Statistics Division, Telecommunication 
Development Bureau, accessed 4 Sep. 2017; and 
ITU, ICT Facts and Figures, 2016 (ITU: Geneva, 
2016).
users in the world, over 3 billion are 
on social media platforms at any 
given time.5 Combined, the three 
major platforms covered for this 
work have almost 4 billion users 
worldwide, which indicates multi-
platform use and the potential for 
cross-platform networks. As of 
mid-2017, Facebook had 2.01 billion 
monthly-active users, Twitter had  
328 million and YouTube had  
1.5 billion logged-in visitors.6 Across 
all age groups, people average two 
hours a day of social media use 
globally; and one in every three 
minutes of online time is devoted to 
some kind of social networking or 
messaging.7 
Recent research also indicates 
that the growing positioning of 
ICT companies 
means that 
online platforms 
and those who 
develop them 
are increasingly 
part of the divide 
that separates 
developers from 
users, and that 
the latter are left out of decision-
making processes on what the 
technologies will do.8 Part of the 
5  Kemp, S., ‘Three billion people now use 
social media’, Wearesocial.com, 10 Aug. 2017,  
4 Sep. 2017.
6  Matney, L., ‘YouTube has 1.5 billion 
logged-in monthly users watching a ton of 
mobile videos’, Techcrunch.com, 4 Sep. 2017; 
Statista.com, ‘Number of monthly active 
Twitter users worldwide from first quarter 
2010 to second quarter 2017 (in millions)’ 4 Sep. 
2017; and Zephoria.com, ‘The top 20 valuable 
Facebook statistics’, updated Aug.  2017, 
accessed 4 Sep. 2017. 
7  GlobalWebIndex.net, ‘GWI social: 
GlobalWebIndex’s quarterly report on the 
latest trends in social networking’,  
4 Sep. 2017. 
8  Tufekçi, Z., ‘Engineering the public: 
big data, surveillance and computational 
politics’, First Monday, vol. 19 (2014), 31 Aug. 
2017; McCarthy, D., ‘Technology and “the 
international”: or how I learned to stop 
Some military video game advertisements 
that are designed to sell a video game or 
recruitment advertising for the military 
or a PMSC are also designed to sell 
national security as military security, and 
to promote the view that the presence of 
the military in everyday life is natural
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power of online platforms is derived 
from the lack of transparency 
in the platform algorithms that 
filter or direct how the Internet 
and social media are used. For 
example, the ‘recommendations’ 
suggested by various platforms, 
often during searches or while in 
the process of viewing something, 
build on the previous searches made 
by a particular viewer or from a 
particular ISP (Internet service 
provider), seeming to indicate what 
a user should be interested in or 
what could be seen as popular or 
trending at any given moment. 
These filters can have important 
impacts on user behaviour because 
what viewers or users are exposed 
to online can have an impact on 
whether and how they participate 
or respond. In particular, it is 
important to be aware of self-
censorship and echo chambers. Self-
censorship occurs when individuals 
choose not to engage online 
because of the level of discomfort 
or the potential 
to feel, or actually 
to be, threatened 
online—and at times 
in the physical 
world. Because of 
the level of ‘online 
trolling’ and other threats to 
women and girls, self-censorship is 
a particularly gendered behaviour. 
In 2015, the UN Broadband 
Commission for the Digital 
Development Working Group on 
Broadband and Gender reported 
that 73 per cent of women and 
girls in the world had experienced 
cyber-violence in some form.9 
worrying and love determinism’, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, vol. 41 (2013), 
pp. 470–90.
9  United Nations, Cyber Violence Against 
Women and Girls: A World-Wide Wake Up Call, 
Report by the UN Broadband Commission 
Online threat at this level influences 
the widespread withdrawal from 
contentious, but also often benign, 
subject areas on social media. 
Self-censorship also means that the 
algorithms that filter content have a 
gendered impact, not least because 
filtering means that lower levels of 
participation or responses are likely 
to translate into different activations 
of the filter choices. 
As a structural feature of online 
communication, in particular 
of social media and related 
functionality such as posting 
comments on webpages, anonymity 
facilitates trolling and other kinds of 
online hate, and also radicalization. 
Coupled with distance—often both 
geographic in the physical world 
and in real time in the virtual 
world—anonymity empowers social 
media users to post and comment 
under fewer social constraints. This 
type of behaviour strengthens the 
links between the algorithms and 
online behaviour. 
In terms of user behaviour, 
however, research has shown 
that people do not become more 
polarized but rather polarized 
people tend to rely more on the 
Internet for information and tend to 
rely on sites that confirm what they 
already believe—a key contributory 
factor to so-called echo chambers.10 
These echo chambers also act as 
a type of filter by indicating to 
the algorithms what people in a 
given network or friend group like. 
Networks or groups of people then 
coalesce around liked-minded 
understandings of the information 
for Digital Development Working Group on 
Broadband and Gender (UN Women, UNDP 
and UNESCO: New York, 2015), p. 2.
10  Nie, N. H et al., ‘The World Wide Web 
and the US political news market’, American 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 54 (2010),  
pp. 428–39.
Filters can have important impacts on 
user behaviour since what  users are 
exposed to online can influence whether 
and how they participate or respond
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they share, thereby reinforcing 
users’ perceptions that what they 
are seeing is more widespread and 
socially acceptable than it generally 
is, because people often think that 
what they are seeing is what others 
are seeing and approve of too. 
Living in such echo chambers 
can have a spiralling effect that 
essentially limits the types of online 
information to which people are 
exposed. Thus, seeing only what 
your one’s network does and being 
exposed to like-minded comments 
by like-minded people reinforces 
existing views. Recent research 
also suggests that the type of device 
used to access online information 
can matter, and these differences 
in devices will have an impact on 
research findings going forward. 
For instance, in terms of mobile 
Internet use, people tend to watch 
more videos on tablets than on 
smart phones, although social 
media of all types are accessed 
more on smart phones than on 
tablets.11 This difference in mobile 
access according to device type 
might mean that the audiences 
looked to for an understanding of 
the militarization of content are 
different depending on the type of 
access.
This polarization effect becomes 
important in a variety of ways 
that have broader implications 
for how the politics of social 
media are researched (including 
further studies on militarism and 
militarization) and how policy 
is formulated. These aspects are 
discussed below.
11  Kemp (note 5).
THE MILITARIZATION OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA: AN OVERVIEW
Social media and the three 
industries 
It is in the context of the global 
information age and the revolution 
in communications technology that 
the staggering array of militarized 
content has grown on social media. 
The Militarization 2.0 project 
focused on the social media content 
of the top global arms producers, 
the military video games industry 
and PMSCs—three industries that 
have an official corporate social 
media presence (see box 1). All of the 
major arms-producing companies, 
such as Saab, BAE Systems and 
Lockheed Martin, have a social 
media presence across YouTube, 
Twitter and Facebook. In the 
popular cultural sphere, military 
video games such as Call of Duty and 
the Swedish developed Battlefield 
series sell many millions of copies 
per annum and the associated 
promotional videos produced 
for the military games analysed 
have been watched over 1 billion 
times on YouTube. In the case of 
PMSCs, their activity on Twitter 
and YouTube is integral to their 
recruitment objectives. 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND 
ANALYSIS
Because social media and online 
communications more broadly 
are a vital part of international 
relations at the everyday level and 
contribute to how people perceive 
and respond to the world around 
them, policymakers and CSOs need 
the skill sets to be able to critically 
assess the social media content of 
international relations, in particular 
the content produced by actors often 
thought to produce neutral political 
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Box 1. Key facts about the social media presence of arms and military video games industries and private military 
and security companies
Arms producers 
According to the most recent figures available from SIPRI, the sales of arms and military services by the SIPRI Top 100 largest 
arms producers and military services companies totalled $370.7 billion in 2015.a SIPRI’s 2012 Top 100 Arms-producing and 
Military Services Companies were used as the basis for mapping the arms industry’s social media presence. At that time, these 
arms producers had 88 official corporate YouTube channels; 69 on Facebook; and 75 on Twitter, not including those channels/
accounts for company divisions and for individual weapon systems such as those for the F-35 and related programmes. b  
The military video games industry
Video games are the archetypal example of the digitized society. The sector is projected to grow to $93.2 billion per annum by 
2019 at an annual growth rate of 5.7 per cent. c  Women in key markets such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan 
now make up nearly half of all players, and players are spending ever longer hours at play. d  One of the key industry sub-sectors 
is that of military combat games. The Call of Duty series (the industry leader in sales terms) has combined sales of over  
250 million copies and total revenues of over US$ 15 billion, making it globally one of the largest popular entertainment 
franchises in terms of revenues generated. e  Yet the importance of military video games is also explicitly political. Highly 
controversially, the military is increasingly moving into video game-based recruitment, through the production of military 
games such as America’s Army in the USA (2002–ongoing) and Glorious Mission in China (2011–ongoing), and devising 
recruitment campaigns based on video game-based iconography, such as the 2009 ‘Start Thinking Soldier’ campaign in the 
UK. f  There are also wider concerns and military games are frequently accused of ‘racial othering’ and promoting ‘recreational 
violence’. g 
Private military and security companies 
Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been defined as ‘private business entities that provide military and/or 
security services . . . in particular, armed guarding and the protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and 
other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and 
security personnel’. h  Governments, or rather their militaries, such as US and British governments, have increasingly relied on 
PMSCs, particularly when engaged in missions in conflict zones, for example, in Afghanistan or Iraq. While it is quite common 
to define PMSCs in functional terms with respect to their services, a number of scholars have criticized this approach. They 
argue that focusing on functionality masks the ideational and political aspects of the work—aspects that form an increasingly 
important part of their commercial transactions and competition. Sharing these concerns—and based on the assumption that it 
is not just their often claimed efficiency and effectiveness, but rather that PMSCs themselves shape and influence how they are 
perceived—the project examined their social media use. In 2014, of the 584 PMSCs surveyed by the project, 252 had at least one 
social media account. Approximately 40 per cent were on Facebook and Twitter and over 10 per cent were on YouTube.
a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘Global arms industry: USA remains dominant despite decline, sales rise in 
Western Europe and Russia, says SIPRI’, Press release, 5 Dec. 2016,.
b Militarization 2.0 Project Data on the Top 100 Arms Producers in 2012 (collected Oct. and Nov. 2014).
c PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), ‘Video games: Key insights at a glance’, Global entertainment and media outlook, 2015–19, PWC Outlook 
Insights, 4 Sep. 2017.
d Interactive Software Federation of Europe, Video Games in Europe: Consumer Study, European summary report (London: IPSOS Media 
CT, November 2012); and Entertainment Software Association, ‘Essential facts about the computer and video game industry: 2017 sales, 
demographic and usage data’, 4 Sep. 2017.
e  Activision, ‘Activision Blizzard announces fourth quarter and full year 2015 financial results’, Press release, 11 Feb. 2016, 4 Sep. 2017.
f  British Army, Start thinking soldier, ‘Mission training: SA80 rifle’; Power, M., ‘Digitized virtuosity: Video war games and post-9/11 cyber-
deterrence’, Security Dialogue, vol. 38, no. 2 (2007), pp. 271–88; Chan, D., ‘Dead-in-Iraq: the spatial politics of digital game art activism and 
in-game protest’, eds N. Huntemann and M. Payne, Joystick Soldiers: The Politics of Play in Military Video Games (Routledge: London, 2010); and 
Robinson, N., ‘Videogames, persuasion and the war on terror: escaping or embedding the military-entertainment complex?’, Political Studies, 
vol. 60, no. 3 (2012), pp. 504–22.
g  Šisler, V., ‘Digital Arabs: Representation in video games’, European Journal of Cultural Studies, vol. 11, no. 2 (2008), pp. 203–20.
h Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The Montreux Document: On Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed 
Conflict (ICRC: Geneva, Aug. 2009), 4 Sep. 2017.
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messaging. Understanding the 
political importance of social media 
rests on understanding social media 
content, meaning construction in 
social media posts and comments, 
and how users engage with social 
media. 
Militarized social media content
The social media content of the arms 
industry, the military video games 
industry and PMSCs represents 
a mix of material: the blatantly 
militaristic alongside more banal 
images and text that can in effect be 
more powerful than the militaristic 
in normalizing the military as the 
natural provider of state security. 
The research presented here 
focused on the content of the official 
corporate YouTube channels of the 
three industries and the Twitter 
content of PMSCs. 
The arms producers’ corporate 
presence on social media—
especially on YouTube and the 
videos these corporations upload 
to other online platforms such as 
Facebook and corporate websites—
is blended in an entertainment 
mindset that results in short films 
and other outputs that seek to 
capture the viewers’ attention in 
much the same way as Hollywood’s 
output. The research analysed over 
200 arms-related videos, produced 
by both industry users and ‘fans’, 
that have been watched over 
570 million times. 
Using elements identified in 
the tropes or rhetorical devices 
described below, the arms industry 
uses combinations of images, 
sounds and texts to draw or build on 
existing stories that evoke certain 
understandings about security. 
These are often complicated 
by assumptions around gender, 
race, class and ethnicity. Such 
combinations often mirror those 
found in the military video games 
industry, and the messaging from 
each industry supports the other. 
Furthermore, because the context 
in which the viewer receives a 
message matters, it is telling that 
arms producers’ YouTube videos 
are often tagged as ‘entertainment’ 
or ‘science’, which can further 
obfuscate the types of meaning that 
are being constructed.
Military video games in popular 
culture were subjected to a 
detailed analysis. The more than 
500 videos produced by the video 
games industry 
and hosted on its 
official YouTube 
channels have 
cumulatively 
been watched 
over 660 million 
times. The analysis 
focused on the most popular 
military video games, such as those 
in the Call of Duty and Battlefield 
series. A qualitatively informed 
coding process was used that 
explicitly set out to capture what is 
seen in these videos. The variables 
focused on: spatial geography  
(e.g. urban and rural spaces, deserts 
and jungles); indicators of gender 
(e.g. male and female combatants 
and civilians); the type of military 
equipment represented (e.g. drones, 
tanks or aircraft); how violence is 
depicted (e.g. terrorism, violence 
against civilians); and, which 
countries were depicted in the 
conflict. This allowed reflection 
on the ‘militarization tropes’ of a 
‘clean war’, ‘supporting the troops’, 
‘technofetishism’ and ‘good, natural 
Many of the social media messages related 
to the arms and video games industries 
are frequently part of a complex branding 
process that is connected to a form of state 
branding
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and necessary’, which are set out 
below.12 
In the case of the PMSCs, 
YouTube videos often are addressed 
to veterans for recruitment 
purposes, but so are Twitter 
messages. The PMSCs claim to 
understand veterans and promise 
them jobs that allow them to apply 
their unique expertise but that are 
also sensitive to their specific needs. 
Companies also convey the message 
that veterans are irreplaceable and 
essential to enabling PMSCs to 
do their work properly—they help 
them to support their mission of 
defending the state in a similar vein 
to the supporting the troops trope 
found in the arms producers’ and 
military video games industry’s 
corporate videos. 
In addition to being a business 
asset, much in the same way as the 
arms producers often showcase 
veterans in their workforces, 
veterans are a means for PMSCs 
to assert their superiority as 
security actors. In contrast to 
states, which often are accused of 
abandoning those who have fought 
for them, PMSCs pride themselves 
in compensating for veterans’ 
disabilities while at the same time 
restoring their manhood and 
integrating them into society as 
civilians. Further, the competition 
with states’ militaries in the case 
of recruitment is apparent in the 
PMSCs’ Twitter recruitment 
messages, in which companies 
brand themselves in an ambivalent 
12  Robinson, N., ‘Militarism and opposition 
in the living room: the case of military 
videogames’, Critical Studies on Security,  
vol. 4, no. 3 (2016), pp. 255–75; and Robinson, N. 
and Schulzke, M., ‘Visualising war? Towards 
a visual analysis of videogames and social 
media’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 14, no. 4 
(2016), pp. 995–1010.
way and like the military as 
‘enterprising soldiers’.13
Meaning construction
Social media content is composed 
of combinations of images, sounds 
and/or texts that come together in 
meaningful ways. The messages 
of the social media covered in this 
Policy Brief are most often part of 
a complex branding process that is 
usually thought of in terms of public 
relations and can be considered a 
form of state branding, especially 
for the arms and video games 
industries. Intertextuality is a 
fundamental aspect of analysing 
meaning construction on social 
media. This means that what is 
seen, heard and read have meanings 
for people because of how images, 
sounds and texts overlap with one 
another. Texts, broadly speaking, 
are not independent and only take 
on meaning because other texts 
exist. In addition, the power of 
social media is that much of it is 
about images—whether moving or 
still. In part because of social media 
and the amount of time spent on 
it, more and more of everyday life 
contains visual elements. 
Images are a specific kind of 
text that, because of their nature, 
make meaning construction more 
complicated. They strike in the 
viewer a sense of immediacy of 
response, are easily circulated 
and are often ambiguous in their 
intended meaning.14 In videos in 
particular, images are coupled with 
13  Strand, S. and Berndtsson, J., ‘Recruiting 
the “enterprising soldier”: Military 
recruitment discourses in Sweden and the 
United Kingdom’, Critical Military Studies,  
vol. 1, no. 3 (2015), pp. 233–48.
14  Hansen, L., ‘Theorizing the image for 
security studies: Visual securitization and the 
Muhammad cartoons’, European Journal of 
International Relations, vol. 17 (2011), pp. 51–74.
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sounds that further convey meaning 
by aiming to influence, among other 
things, whether users feel that a 
message is authentic. Because these 
industry actors often are considered 
authorities on representing conflict 
and security, and their messaging 
is linked to official discourses on 
what national security means, how 
viewers construct meaning from 
their social media messaging can 
reinforce the idea that a strong 
state using military methods is the 
natural security provider. Thus, 
the underlying mechanisms that 
influence meaning construction in 
these messages can be used both 
consciously and unconsciously 
in part to evoke emotions tied to 
identifying national security as 
military security.15
In the case of the videos 
promoting video games, there are 
two key trends. First, there is the 
search for authenticity, which is 
normally invoked by videos that 
promote a game through the use 
of ‘real actors’ or ‘veterans’ who 
are legitimized as ‘advisers’ to 
the developers. That said, there is 
also a very strong entertainment 
strand within video games videos, 
which also can be found in a great 
many of the military equipment 
videos. Here, infographics, rapid 
images, bombastic music and so 
on are combined in visually and 
sonically arresting short videos 
that emphasize excitement and 
exhilaration. There is thus an 
important secondary type of 
intertextual synergy between the 
respective industries, in which 
authenticity is suppressed for 
excitement.
15  Jackson, S. T., ‘“Selling” national security: 
Saab, YouTube and the militarized neutrality 
of Swedish citizen identity’, Critical Military 
Studies (Forthcoming). 
Systematic examination of online 
content—including of institutional 
posts by corporations and user-
generated content as either a (re)post 
or a comment—makes it possible 
to identify the mechanisms that 
support intended and unintended 
meaning constructions. Corporate 
advertising 
and branding 
are typical 
uses of online 
communication and social media—
particularly corporate presence on 
social media—that lend themselves 
to political messaging that can 
be disentangled from traditional 
notions of advertising. User reposts 
of and comments on this messaging 
can contribute to meaning 
construction.
PMSCs usually are viewed 
as either service providers or 
mercenaries. The research shows 
that they are also political actors; 
they make use of their discursive 
power to shape how they are 
perceived, increase their sales and 
establish themselves as acceptable 
and superior security actors. Like 
a chameleon, and depending on 
their clients’ needs, they assume 
the identity of a generic business, 
a military actor or a humanitarian 
actor.
PMSCs use social media to shape 
their image, but in somewhat 
different ways than more 
conventional businesses: they ‘hide 
in plain sight’. While posting very 
little about themselves, companies 
frequently join in viral debates 
posting positive content to distract 
from the security matters they are 
concerned with, such as when they 
post news related to charitable 
activities. PMSCs are not just a 
service provider for the military; 
they are increasingly competing 
with it for recruits, using Twitter as 
PMSCs use social media to both shape 
their image and ‘hide in plain sight’
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a primary means and particularly 
targeting veterans.
Often, the messaging used in the 
corporate promotional material 
posted by the arms and military 
video games industries as well 
as by PMSCs presents military 
security as a common sense notion 
and a natural assumption about 
the provision of national security, 
making it something that is difficult 
to question outright or even to think 
of questioning in the first place.16 
Corporations use what academic 
research identifies as tropes, or a 
series of rhetorical techniques using 
non-literal descriptions to represent 
something else (see figure 1). Often 
resting on gendered and racialized 
constructions, among other things, 
such tropes tend to obfuscate the 
reality of something, in this case the 
realities of what these industries 
are marketing—national security 
as military security. In this case, 
instead of being open about the 
militarism behind the messaging 
16  Jackson, S. T., ‘Marketing militarism in 
the digital age: arms production, YouTube and 
“selling” national security’, eds C. Hamilton 
and L. J. Shepherd, Understanding Popular 
Culture and World Politics in the Digital Age 
(London: Routledge, 2016).
and the active attempts to use 
social media messaging to sell ideas 
that benefit from the privileging 
of the military, industry actors 
use messaging games either to 
make war seem not as bad as it 
is in reality or to profit from war 
(e.g. when corporations frame 
soldiers or veterans as business 
assets). Through their social 
media messaging, these tropes are 
combined in ways that convey this 
acceptance of military security as 
natural or ‘common sense’. 
The research identified four 
overarching tropes that repeatedly 
play out in the YouTube videos 
from the arms and military video 
games industries and in the 
industries’ messaging on Twitter 
and Facebook. The tropes examined 
are based on Roger Stahl’s research 
on the first three tropes he discusses 
in Militainment Inc.: War, Media and 
Popular Culture and Susan Jackson’s 
development of ‘good, natural and 
necessary’ in her writing on the 
arms industry.17
The ‘clean war’ trope is when war 
is presented in a way that alienates 
the viewer from the death caused 
by people at war by referring 
to the violence and those who 
perpetrate it in ways that remove 
the feeling of destruction. The arms 
industry’s use of the term ‘customer’ 
accompanying an image of a soldier 
in uniform or a company referring 
to the development of a new attack 
helicopter as an ‘adventure’ are 
examples of the clean war trope. 
The viewer is prompted to think 
of the soldier as a consumer 
rather than a combatant, and the 
development of a combat aircraft as 
similar to an excursion or a fun day 
out. The use of language removes or 
17  Stahl, R., Militainment, Inc.: War, Media 
and Popular Culture (Routledge: London, 
2009); and Jackson (note 16).
Figure 1. Word cloud for identifying tropes in arms industry YouTube 
promotional videos
Source: Militarization 2.0 arms industry database, 2017.
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hides the industry’s contribution to 
war. Advertisements for video games 
similarly emphasize clean war with 
an absence of collateral damage and 
civilian casualties. 
The ‘technofetishism’ trope is 
when weapons are presented in a 
way that glorifies the technological 
aspects of war, based on the 
assumption that technology is 
desirable in and of itself, and 
consequently obfuscates the effects 
of using the weapons. The arms 
and video games industries rely on 
technofetishism as a way to make 
the equipment they showcase 
interesting to the layperson while 
hiding behind the technical aspects 
of the weapon as a deflection, for 
example when referencing forward-
looking infrared (FLIR) technology 
but not the implications of using it.18 
When a YouTube video refers to a 
weapon by name, most social media 
users are unlikely to know what it is 
or what it does.
As with technofetishism, the 
‘support the troops’ trope arises 
when discussion of a war is removed 
from those who made the decision 
to go to war to the people who are 
fighting it ‘on your side’, which 
makes questioning the legitimacy 
of that war difficult. The support 
the troops trope manifests itself 
in references to soldiers on the 
battlefront as ‘people in harm’s 
way’ or in a ‘danger zone’, so that 
questioning the war becomes 
a questioning of something or 
somebody else. In this way, the 
troops are treated more as victims 
of the war than as having chosen 
to embroil themselves in a conflict. 
This trope is further emphasized 
in military video games by framing 
most of the games around the 
18  Forward-looking infrared is a type of 
thermal imaging that enables people to ‘see’ at 
night.
USA, which is typically attacked 
or invaded by an enemy, making 
a military response essential and 
morally unproblematic.
The ‘good, natural and necessary’ 
trope—either singularly or 
together—arises when the military 
is presented in a way that makes 
it unquestionably something 
good for the public, and natural 
and/or necessary for providing 
security for the state. One way in 
which companies use this trope is 
to construct an ‘Us’ who belongs 
and is protected and two kinds of 
‘Them’: those who cannot protect 
themselves so ‘we’ should; and those 
from whom ‘we’ and the weak must 
be protected. The military—and the 
companies’ weapons—are painted as 
good, natural and necessary ways to 
achieve this protection.
The research related to PMSCs 
in this project also addressed the 
normalization of military values 
in everyday life. 
PMSCs take on 
multiple identities 
(military, 
business and 
humanitarian) in 
an eclectic way 
with which their clients can identify 
and with the help of which they 
establish themselves as acceptable, 
legitimate and normal security 
actors.19 In addition, corporate 
videos and branding on the Internet 
19  Joachim, J. and Schneiker, A., Private 
Security and Identity Politics: Ethical Hero 
Warriors, Professional Managers and New 
Humanitarians (London and New York: 
Routledge, forthcoming); Joachim, J. and 
Schneiker, A., ‘All for one and one in all: 
PMSCs as soldiers, business managers 
and humanitarians’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 27, no. 2 (2014), 
pp. 246–67; and Joachim, J. and Schneiker, 
A., ‘Private Sicherheits- und Militärfirmen: 
ein Chamäleon der Internationalen Politik’ 
[Private security and military companies: a 
chameleon of international politics], Zeitschrift 
Tropes in social media messaging are 
combined to convey the acceptance of 
military security as natural or ‘common 
sense’
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can be embedded in news articles, 
adding a certain kind of authenticity 
or legitimacy to the corporate 
messaging by framing the branding 
as news and therefore more likely to 
be a credible—rather than corporate 
biased—representation. For 
instance, these kinds of situations 
arise when news outlets post 
stories about weapon systems and 
corresponding videos of journalists 
flying in combat aircraft trainers 
in much the same way as one might 
test-drive a car—a kind of human-
für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, vol. 1, no. 1 
(2012), pp. 44–71.
interest news story rather than one 
about a weapon. The language in 
these kinds of stories tends to centre 
on the entertainment value of the 
experience for the journalist and 
to obfuscate the fighting purpose 
of the aircraft behind its technical 
aspects. In addition, arms industry 
communications personnel claim 
that their YouTube videos are aimed 
at those in government who will 
make decisions on weapons funding 
and purchases, as well as at the 
broader communities in which the 
weapons systems are built. This 
makes questioning policy decisions 
on weapons procurement more 
difficult because of the common 
sense notions on which the meaning 
construction relies.20 
Similarly, in the case of popular 
culture and in particular video 
games, complex geopolitical social 
problems such as humanitarian 
catastrophe are always ‘solved’ 
militarily—there is no place for 
diplomacy or negotiation in such 
games. Cumulatively, militarized 
social media serves to make the 
presence of the military, war and 
war fighting seem ubiquitous and 
‘normal’. 
Analysis: militarized social media 
engagement
The research analysed 
approximately 7 million YouTube 
comments made by social media 
users on a combination of video 
games and pop videos with 
a military theme, as well as 
military equipment videos, both 
official industry videos and those 
produced by military enthusiasts 
(see table 1). The research sought 
to track and map what people 
are saying in their social media 
20  Jackson (notes 15 and 16).
Table 1. Overview of engagement with militaristic social media content
Type of content Total number of videosa
Total number 
of views
Total number 
of comments 
Video game trailers 583 1 654 807 787 4 617 992
Video game walkthroughsb 155 134 584 741 377 398
Video game reviews 37 26 857 482 167 002
Video game fan material 56 183 371 498 307 350
Subtotal video game 831 1 999 621 508 5 469 742
Mainstream pop videos 19 1 854 404 185 848 387
Military music memes 20 9 260 005 90 074
Subtotal music 39 1 863 664 190 938 461
Industry videos 157 218 042 333 158 882
Industry fan videos 57 354 866 904 182 108
Subtotal military industry 214 572 909 237 340 990
Total all categories 1 084 4 436 194 935 6 749 193
a Views of and comments on 1,084 YouTube videos of military video games, rock 
and pop music, and the arms industry.
b A video game walkthrough is video that is recorded by a player of a game in 
which the person plays through the game with the specific aim of demonstarting 
how to complete it. The walkthroughs in this dataset are complete walkthroughs 
which are subdivided into multiple videos (typically 15–20 per game). In total, 
the dataset contains walkthroughs for a total of 3 mainstream military shooters 
(Battlefield 1, Call of Duty Advanced Warfare, Call of Duty Modern Warfare 3), and 
5 other video games in which militarism is engaged with, albeit sometimes in a 
critical way. Where possible the walkthroughs were all taken from the channel 
of the Rad Brad <https://www.youtube.com/user/theRadBrad>, one of the most 
popular walkthrough people on YouTube with 7.7 million subscribers and  
2.9 billion views.
Source: Militarization 2.0 military video games industry database.
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comments and to explore whether 
what is said is similar or different 
if they are commenting on a 
video game advertisement or a 
military equipment video. At the 
time of writing, the results are 
preliminary but strong trends 
have been identified for explicit 
endorsements of technologically 
superior weaponry. This shows that 
the clean war and technofetishism 
tropes are being reaffirmed by 
social media users. Importantly, 
there are also frequent examples 
of conversations on social media in 
which posters ascribe credibility 
to themselves by identifying as 
soldiers or former soldiers, which 
gives them authority to comment 
on the authenticity of a video game 
or a video’s content. This affirms 
the importance of the support 
the troops trope, as responses 
that fail to value such comments 
are frequently ‘dealt with’ in a 
very aggressive manner. Finally, 
there are important inter-textual 
comments in a significant minority 
of cases in which comments on 
military equipment videos will, for 
example, mention that the writer 
has used the equipment in a military 
video game. 
Preliminary research on mapping 
social networks across Facebook 
and the sharing of militarized 
content from arms producers 
suggests that arms producers’ 
‘Facebook friends’ are a fairly 
isolated group of users. The 
network of shared information 
from official corporate pages to 
other, non-militarized locations on 
Facebook seems to be unstructured 
and inefficient in terms of how 
broadly this information is shared. 
The networks through which the 
information is shared are more 
like ‘fan clubs’ than a targeted 
spread of militarized messaging. In 
addition, from the sample selected 
for the network analysis, media 
outlets seemed to be the biggest 
content providers in sharing 
militarized messaging about arms 
production, thus dominating any 
mainstream conversation about 
arms production. These initial 
findings suggest that social media 
users who share arms industry 
Facebook posts directly from arms 
producers remain in fragmented 
groups, which supports the 
polarization claims made elsewhere, 
and the theories on how echo 
chambers work. This Facebook 
research is a work in progress 
and will be continued beyond the 
Militarization 2.0 project to include 
the remediation of corporate posts 
that are hosted by and shared 
through fan or enthusiast channels, 
as these channels often have a wider 
viewership and larger comments 
sections.
Tweets and YouTube videos 
from PMSCs were collected and 
analysed to examine how these 
companies conceive of themselves 
and construct their identities. A 
focus on the identities of the PMSCs 
rather than the services they offer 
sheds light on the discursive power 
of companies, 
through which 
they position 
themselves in 
an increasingly 
competitive 
market by telling 
their clients who they are, which 
group or groups they belong to 
and what makes them distinctive. 
Identities also can mean influence: 
through them, actors can shape 
how they are perceived by other 
actors, reinforce and reproduce the 
meaning of the particular identities 
they appropriate, or even completely 
change how they are constituted. 
Cumulatively, militarized social media 
serves to make the presence of the 
military, war and war fighting seem 
ubiquitous and ‘normal’
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From a gender perspective, 
PMSCs draw on civilized and 
accepted forms of masculinity and 
femininity, presenting themselves 
as ‘highly skilled professional’ 
military strategists and ordinary 
businesses akin to banks or 
insurance companies. However, 
PMSCs also engage in strategies 
of (hyper)masculinization and 
pathologization to set themselves 
apart from mercenaries, their 
private sector competitors and 
state security forces. In this 
respect, companies appear to view 
themselves as ‘ethical hero warriors’ 
and claim to differ from their 
predecessors and black sheep in the 
industry on the grounds that they 
are not only committed to ethical 
and moral conduct, but also truly 
concerned about peace and order 
around the globe.
The consequences of militarized 
social media
In addition, there are a number 
of structural issues regarding 
social media and the meaning 
construction that centres on 
common sense assumptions about 
military security. As noted above, 
the algorithms behind the social 
media platforms can lead to an 
echo chamber effect in which 
like-minded people gather together, 
causing divisions in the virtual 
world. These echo chambers might 
mean that only those who are 
predisposed to the pro-militarism 
messaging are likely to be exposed 
to it.21 Algorithms can contribute 
to this exposure by continuing 
to recommend content that is 
21  Pears, L. and Robinson, N., ‘Seeing not 
seeing: the lived experiences of militarization 
of/on social media’, Paper prepared for the 
International Studies Association Annual 
Convention, Baltimore, USA, 22–25 Feb. 2017.
similar to that already viewed, 
compounding the echo chamber 
effect. 
In order to understand how 
militarized social media are 
experienced by social media users, 
and the importance of this echo 
chamber effect, a number of focus 
groups were conducted with social 
media users. The findings were 
perhaps counter-intuitive. Many of 
the respondents reported little or 
no experience of militaristic social 
media. There are three competing 
explanations for this: a failure to 
recall, algorithms within social 
media that filter what is seen, and 
self-regulation of social media 
content. While, on the surface, 
the capacity of the respondents 
to avoid militaristic social media 
may provide some comfort to those 
concerned about technological 
determinism and the vulnerability 
of the public to militarization, 
this leads to a deeper cause for 
concern. While the majority do 
not experience militarism in this 
sphere, the algorithms within 
social media and social media 
practice suggest more effective 
targeting of those predisposed to 
militaristic content and perhaps 
most susceptible to pro-military 
messages. User exposure and 
reaction will be examined further 
following the Militarization 2.0 
project to explore whether different 
segments of the online population—
such as members of the military, 
arms producers’ employees, gamers 
and others—experience higher 
levels of militaristic content due 
to—or perhaps in spite of—the 
algorithms.
Understanding the power of 
algorithms is fundamental to 
understanding social media and 
online behaviour. It requires 
additional attention from academic, 
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technology and policy circles, 
ideally through people from each 
of these fields working together 
to untangle the very real effects 
that the backend of technology has 
on social and political lives. This 
research on algorithms shows that 
while militarism might be widely 
circulating in more isolated corners 
of the Internet, there are potentially 
militarizing effects on social media 
users that could have implications 
for how extremism-promoting 
online materials are studied and 
treated elsewhere. Algorithms are 
an important structural component 
of ‘targeted militarism’, not least 
if society is concerned about the 
potential for radicalization of 
social media users by material 
posted for recruitment reasons. 
The militarism research indicates 
that a broader view of what might 
qualify as radicalizing material is 
required, which covers both who 
it is aimed at and who is providing 
it. The current preoccupation 
with radicalization by terrorist 
organizations when reconsidered 
as a question of recruitment by all 
violent social actors suggests the 
need to think seriously about the 
overlap between how the role of 
social media in military recruitment 
and recruitment to extremist 
and terrorist organizations is 
understood. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Policymakers and their staff, 
members of CSOs and others who 
engage with the public need training 
on critical assessment of social media.
The research shows that people and 
agencies that engage with the public 
need to gain the skills necessary 
to understand visual social media 
and to identify the key tropes in 
the social media messaging used 
by a variety of actors. These skills 
include the ability to identify how 
social media messages often are 
inserted into non-military spaces 
and people’s everyday lives, and 
therefore have the potential to 
normalize military security as the 
common sense default security. 
The Militarization 2.0 project 
is developing a short course on 
learning how to dissect social media 
content. This course is geared to 
policymakers and members of 
CSOs to enable them to understand 
the messaging in the social media 
content discussed here. 
2. Diversification of staff skill sets 
can facilitate integration of critical 
assessments of social media content 
into international relations work.
Social media messaging and related 
online behaviour are challenging 
what is known about how people 
communicate. The interactive 
structure of social media and the 
algorithms that prompt some kinds 
of behaviour mean that a variety of 
people are needed to work together 
to understand what is happening on 
social media. This challenge means 
that communications and analysis 
staff need to be interdisciplinary 
and from a variety of backgrounds. 
Government agencies and 
CSOs need to bring in staff with 
backgrounds in critical media 
studies and political communication 
alongside experts in technology 
use rather than assuming that 
organizational communication 
and analysis should be conducted 
only by those people who are 
trained in public relations and 
communications, or marketing and 
branding. It is also important to 
work with academics who specialize 
in related fields.
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3. These staff should grow 
social media interaction beyond 
traditional communications to 
be able to critically analyse what 
is happening in everyday social 
media communication beyond the 
institutional channels. 
Research findings on polarization 
suggest that policymakers and 
members of CSOs should look 
beyond their established networks 
to understand online behaviour. In 
addition to the militaristic material 
covered in the research, behaviour 
around other types of online content 
would be better understood if 
analysis included ways of targeting 
how algorithms contribute to echo 
chambers and the potential effects 
of targeted messaging.
4. National debates on whether 
militarized social media content 
should be more effectively restricted 
for minors. 
Given that so much Internet use is 
by minors, and given the ubiquitous 
growth of mobile social media 
usage by this age group, there are 
important ethical and normative 
questions to be posed about the 
responsibility of the state, arms and 
entertainment industries, and how 
they target militarism to vulnerable 
age groups. At present, much 
of the concern in the ‘West’ has 
centred on how to restrict access 
to content that might contribute 
to ‘radicalization’ and attract 
vulnerable people to pro-terrorist 
messaging. The conclusions of this 
research, however, suggest the 
need for a broader public debate 
about the ways in which content 
that promotes militarism also 
should be considered harmful. The 
targeted militarism found suggests 
that audience demographics are 
central to an understanding of who 
receives cross-platform messaging 
and whether young people’s online 
activities need closer monitoring.
5. Better understanding is needed 
regarding the ways in which 
algorithms are used in social media 
to effectively target specific audiences 
for social media content. 
Algorithms drive targeted 
messaging. Policymakers, members 
of CSOs and academics need a fuller 
grasp of how algorithms work 
and their political implications. 
Policymakers must consider 
whether militarized social media 
should be seen in equivalent terms 
as ‘radicalized social media content’. 
